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PREFACE
This is a slightly ｾ ･ ｶ ｩ ｳ ･ ､ version ｯ ｾ the invited
paper presented at the' "SCRIER-NCAER Workshop on Technology",
held in New Delhi on April 11 and 12, 1980.
The seminar was ｳ ｰ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｯ ｾ ･ ､ jointly by ｓｃｒｉｅｾＭＭｓｴ･･ｾｩｮＹ
Committee for Research in Intexnational Economic Relations--·and
NCAER--National Council of Applied Economic Research .
...·iii-·

BUILDING TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY FOR
SELF-RELIANCE
Kirit S. Parikh
In spite of a clear national commitment, the strong political
will of the two major prime-ministers, the input of a huge amount
of resources over the past three decades, and a cultural background
where the "brahminical achievements" of Rand D are highly valued,
we still have a long way to go before a scientific attitude and
approach are instilled into our society. This is obvious when one
considers the national reaction to the total eclipse of the sun
on February 16, 1980.
Delhi was a ghost-town and I am sure that the other cities
in the country were also so. Not only did people not look at the
eclipse but they also refused to stir out of their homes. Some
even drew the curtains lest the "evil" rays of the eclipsed sun
come and blind them. The fact that an eclipse is an occurence
which is understood by science, and that watching it could be
scientifically instructive to all, particularly children, was not
recognized. Instead of taking this opportunity to instil
enthusiasm, excitement and a wonder of nature in their children,
they were scared, frightened and made superstitious.
Moreover, the Director of the country's premier medical
research institute was gleeful and triumphant at the psychosis
he was able to generate with the help of our equally unscientific
mass media. The dangers of watching the eclipse are easily
explainable and the necessary precautions against them not hard
to take. The masses in India are still not considered educable
and so not only was an opportunity to spread some enlightment
lost, but also superstition was bred. An equally depressing fact
was that people in general did not ask why it was dangerous to
look at the sun.
Why, one must ask, are we so unscientific? What have been
the limitations of our efforts to build S & T capability? What
have been our achievements? Have we spent resources wisely?
What should we do to improve the S & T climate in our country?
It is these issues that this paper is addressed to.
Table 1. Growth of education.
Expendi- No. of No. of Insti- No. of medi-
ture on univer- with post- medical
educa- sities* graduate colleges
Years tion lIT's courses
(Rs.crores)
1947-48 55 20 5 22
1950-51 114 30 1 10 30
1960-61 344 59 5 33 71
1970-71 1118 95 5 77 99
1975-76 2107 111 5 n.a. 109
*rncluding institutes deemed as universities.
Building Up the Scientific Manpower
India's achievements in developing a large and diversified
S & T system are impressive. The growth of educational facilities,
output and stock of scientific and technological manpower are
shown in tables 1 to 3. '
Compared to other developing countries, India's quantatitive
achievements in this area are significant. However, these
figures alone do not give any idea of the quality of the training
or the problem solving ability of the scientific personnel
trained. 'Unfortunately it is difficult to measure the quality
of education and no data exist on the subject. One then has to
proceed with casual empiricism.
The Quality of Technical Education
The fact that apart from creating five lIT's and some minor
curriculum revisions in technical educations, no new innovative
approaches to teaching and training have been tried, implies that
probably the quality of technical education has not improved much
over the past twenty-five years. As one who went through under-
graduate engineering education twenty-five years ago in perhaps
a fairly representative college, I can say that technical education
then did not give one confidence or even a feeling that one could
solve problems in a logical scientific way. The theory that was
taught did not seem related to any practical problems. It was
a frequent complaint of examinees that the paper was difficult
and unfair as it asked questions of a·practical nature.
The fact that no new innovations have been made to remedy
this long standing deficiency of training in India, would also
imply that no new directions are given to course content to make
Table 2: OUtput of Scientific and Technical Persormel fran Universities in ｉ ｮ ､ ｩ ｾ - 1974-1975
Year B.SC. B.SC. M.Sc. M.Sc. Ph.D. ph.D. M.B.B.S. M.D./ BE:/B.SC. MEIM Ph.D.
(Agr. ) (.Agr. ) (sc. ) (}\gr.l ｍ ｾ ｓ Ｎ ﾷ Eng. & Tech.Eng. Eng.
TeCh.' , &'I'ech ....
----.---
1947 5996 535 905 79 N.A. N.A. 959 N.A. 1076 30 N.A.
1950 9628 1000 1425 154 N.A. N.A. 1557 88 2065 100 N.A.
1952 11087 870 2129 223 108 5 2164 113 2882 118 12
1954 14427 910 2911 208 164 4 2582 110 3104 147 19
1956 16126 886 3255 214 210 11 2732 171 4163 278 23
1958 18920 994 3841 313 216 8 2839 281 4237 378 20
1960 22693 1700 5382 488 361 11 3387 397 5660 606 18
1962 26930 2612 7218 704 435 50 3945 525 6863 477 20
1964 34046 4099 8882 823 537 19 4452 771 8813 479 26
1966 42437 5259 10008 1191 774 94 6558 1049 10783 509 39
1968 59606 6239 12682 1372 1100 120 8916 1254 15362 873 66
1970 83610 5909 16578 1670 1212 217 9562 1266 17748 1067 98
1972 111798 5600 15951 1496 1311 267 9524 1420 17315 1051 110
1974 123772 4505 17437 1419 1515 287 10578 2081 13491 1268 163
1975 95382 3966 17341 1511 1484 289 10144 2204 12537 1228 136
Table 3: Stock of Scientific and Technical Personnel - 1950-1977
Category of Personnel Stock a"t "the "end of"" the" eartOOO)
1950 1955 1960 1965 ｴ ｾ Ｗ Ｐ 1971
(Estimated)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(a) Engineering and Technology:
(i) Degree 21.6 37.5 62 •.2 106.7 185.4 251.9
(ii) Diploma 31.5 46.8 75.0 138.9 244.4 346.7
(b) Science:
(i) Post Graduates 16.0 28.0 47.7 85.7 139.2 243.4 Iｾ
( ii) Graduates 60.0 102.9 165.6 261.5 420.0 1182.2 1
(c) Agriculture:
(i) Post Graduates 1.0 2.0 3.7 7.7 13.5
{ 112.7(ii) Graduates 6.9 11.5 20.2 39.4 42.2
(d) Medicine:
(i) Degree 18.0 29.0 41:.6 60.6 97.8 174.3
(ii) Licentiate 33.0 35.0 34.0 31.0 27.0 17.0
Total 188.0 292.7 450.0 731.5 1174.5 2328.2
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it more relevant for a developing country. Engineers trained to
use thumbrules who are not even aware of how the thumbrules are
derived, are not likely to be aware that these thumbrules should
change with relative prices of inputs and/or factors. This also
means that they are not aware of trade-offs. That one can build
a house without plaster, with jalis instead of windows, with
cement floors instead of terazzo tiles and provide one more
room by the savings affected would be understood but not
appreciated by our engineers. Consequently they would never
offer such a choice to a user, who may well opt for a bigger but
"poorly" finished house. But apart from the fact that our
engineers do not fully appreciate such trade-offs, they may also
have a value system that is inappropriate to the country. When
suggested that one could build a cheaper house by sacrificing .
finishes which are functionally not necessary, they react that
this is "langoti (loin-cloth) architecture."
Thus our technical training seems to produce engineers who:
(a) . lack problem solving ability and confidence;
(b) are generally unaware of trade-offs in design and
technical solutions; and
(c) have inadequate appreciation of what is relevant and
appropriate technology for the country.
These deficiencies are such that they can be removed by
appropriate training, by changing the course content and by
introducing more efficient training methods.
Effective Use of Trained Professionals
The potential for technological self-reliance that a
country builds up through training and education of scientists
and technologists can be realized only if they are effectively
employed in R&D and consulting and design organizations. How
effectively have we done this?
The R&D Sector
The effectiveness of R&D is difficult to measure. Yet
applications of R&D should be certainly an important item in it.
In table q are shown the number of patents sealed in the
name of Indians, income of NRDC from Royalty and Premia as also
, the value of goods produced from processes licensed by NRDC
(National Research and Development Corporation). The number of
patents may be an inadequate measure as patent consciousness is
not high in India, yet it does provide some idea about the success
of R&D.
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Table 4. Some Indicators of R&D Applications.
No. of patents Income from Value of goods
sealed in the Royalty & produced by processes
Years name of Indians Premia licensed by NRDC
(Rs.crores) (Rs.crores)
1960-61 .29
1968 426 5.00
1969 645 4.80
1970 596 .22 6.00
1971 629 .26 8.75
1972-73 278 .37 10.00
1973-74 358 .32 12.00
1975 737 .38 18.00
1976 426 .50 23.00
1977 928 .67 40.00 (estimated)
These returns have to be compared with the expenditures on
R&D. These are shown in table 5.
The NRDC royalty can be considered to be based at least on
the CSIR laboratories which have over the years, got between 16
to 25 percent of the central sector outlay on R&D. The NRDC
royalty is extremely meagre compared to this outlay. So also is
the value of producb based on these processes. It is not clear
from the data whether the value of product is "value added" or
just "value of product"--I suspect it is just value of product, .
whereas "value added" should be considered as a proper measure
of benefit of R&D.
Similarly the large amount of resources, between 25% to 40%
of the central sector outlay over the years poured into R&D in
the Department of Atomic Energy (DAB), has yet to give any tangible
economic return to the country.
One may argue that there is an "S"in CSIR which is a
Council"fot ｮ ｯ ｴ ｾ Ｖ ｮ ｬ ｹ Industrial ｒ ･ ｾ ･ ｡ ｲ ｣ ｨ but also for Scientific
Research, and that both DAB and CSIR have been instrumental in
setting up the impressive infrastructure for SST in the country.
Yet even if one were to consider half of the expenditure fully
as expenditure for "scientific" rather than for "industrial"
research, the benefits still seem meagre compared to the costs.
And 30 years is a long enough time for results to show even for
infrastructural development.
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Table 5: Expenditures on R&D (Rs.crores)
Central State Private
Year Sector Sector Sector Total
1948-49 1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1950-51 4.68 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1955-56 12.14 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1958-59 21.78 1.0 0.15 22.93
1965-66 62.45 3.51 2.43 68.39
1968-69 85.72 11.99 9.85 107.56
1969-70 91.59 12.22 12.81 116.62
1970-71 112.47 12.58 14.59 139.64
1971-72 125.93 9.53 16.18 151.64
1972-73 149.67 22.11 22.89 194.67
1973-74 161.53 24.13 30.35 216.01
1974-75 231.14 24.00 36.46 291.60
1975-76 287.61 26.73 42.35 356.69
1976-77 321.73 31.02 49.50 402.25
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It is clear from table 4 that the bulk of R&D expenditure
is under the central sector. The organizations involved in R&D
in the central sector can be grouped in two broad classes. The
discipline or area oriented laboratories such as the CSIR
laboratories and the task oriented organizations such as DAE,
ISRO, ICAR etc.
Another major R&D resources absorbing department is the
Indian Council for Agricultural Research. The contributions of
agricultural research in promoting the green revolution in
agriculture have been significant.
In agricultural research, soil and climate specific varieties
have to be developed. Thus similar researches have to be carried
out in many agricultural stations around the country. Moreover,
a number of agricultural universities are also actively involved
in research. Thus quite a lot of healthy competition exists among
agricultural researchers, and this may not be an insignificant
factor in explaining the success of such research in the country.
Unfortunately, apart from agricultural research, such
competition does not seem to exist in other areas. The CSIR
laboratories (which are usually only one per academic discipline)
tend to be very zealous of their position and claim pre-eminence
in the area. This tends to discourage others from working in
that area. The monopolistic position is maintained through the
unfair competition that a public sector organization offers to
others as it has no compulsion to earn its own living. Moreover,
in such monopolistic laboratories with their characteristic
governmental structure and lack of specific task orientation,
dissent is discouraged and so is creativity. The failure of CSIR
laboratories to perform better than they have even on their own
terms may be explained by this lack of competition. What is
needed is the break up of national laboratories into a number of
independent parallel laboratories.
Another, and perhaps more important, factor in the failure
of the CSIR laboratories to produce appropriate R&D, is lack of
proper perspective on what is socially relevant and appropriate
research. Pre-investigation economic benefit-cost analysis of
research could be very useful in eliminating much research on
irrelevant tasks.
The poor performance of the task oriented organizations can
be explained on the basis of lack of competition and bureaucratic
administrative structures. The need to create competition is
as great as the efforts of some of these departments to prevent
competition. The efforts of BHEL some years ago to set up a
nuclear power plant design and construction organization was
successfully blocked by the DAE which has so far completed only
. one power planb (apart from the plant built by GE on a turnkey
basis). Such attempts at keeping out competition are not confined
to the public sector only, but the public sector is usually more
successful in its attempts than the private sector.
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Consulting and Design Organizations
The development of consulting firms is also hampered by the
inappropriate growth of large public sector design organizations.
Many of these were created to design large complex projects for
which there was no competent body available in the couritry. Some
have grown quite large over the years and have also successfully
carried out a number of projects. Yet this has happened not
without costs. When a large public sector firm exists, it
usually secures all the government and other public sector
organization contracts (procedurally it is easier to award a
contract to a public sector firm even when its costs are high).
Thus no private organization can flourish in the same area.
This lack of competition and cost-plus contracts soon lead to
staleness and mediocrity. It is also typical that such firms
grow large rapidly when they are trying to execute a project.
But should the next project be of a different nature, these firms
are faced with the wrong kind of staff and cannot dismiss
existing staff members who then become idle. Idleness results in
obsolescence and .demoralization. As there are no other firms
in the country engaged in similar work in the area, it is not
easy for them to find alternative employment in the country.
They either vegetate or emigrate.
What is needed is the development of vigorous and active
private competitive consulting and design engineering firms.
The growth of such firms can be stimulated by the practice of
subcontracting which must be encouraged. Public sector design
firms should be small, extremely competent project management
firms capable of parceling out the task to many small firms as
sub-tasks. This would save the public sector firms from getting
stuck with idle men and would promote a healthy growth of private
consulting firms. It would also give people the option to seek
alternative jobs. Dissent, integrity and creativity can then
flourish.
Thus decentralization and competition are required if R&D
and consulting and design organizations are to be revitalized.
The Requirements for Self-Reliance: Not just Know How and Know
Why, but also Know Which
Technological self-reliance requires not only "know-how"
(the knowledge on how to design or execute a technological task)
and "know-why" (why a particular technological process or piece
of equipment is designed the way it is), but also "know-which"
(which of the many technological alternatives should be selected).
Such analytical self-reliance is important if the country is to
avoid the pursuit of irrelevant and/or obselete technologies, or
being tricked into accepting these, and the wasting of efforts,
resources and time in the acquisition of know-how and know-why
concerning them.
Have we given adequate attention to know-which? Are the
strategy and tactics followed by us such that they promote
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question on the relevance and appropriateness of the technologies
being pursued from within the scientific community itself?
''!this is perhaps an area in which we have not made any
systematic effort. And much of the effort wasted in the field
of R&D may result from lack of that effort. Our first task is
to recognize the importance of systems studies for the evaluation
of alternative technologies and the importance of systematic
quantitative approaches to SiT strategy planning.
